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Non-technical summary
In the economic policy debate, income tax progressivity is mostly seen as a means
of redistribution. The more progressive the tax, the more redistribution from the
rich to the poor. However, high tax progressivity also means high marginal tax
rates for those with a high income, which leads to labour supply distortions in this
group and, as a consequence, to a lower overall potential for redistribution. Under
non-competitive wage formation, there are positive aspects of tax progressivity in
the efficiency dimension as well, because tax progressivity lowers the incentives for
high wage claims and leads to a downward pressure on non-competitive wages. This
counteracts the labour supply distortions and creates the potential for a free lunch:
simultaneous equity and efficiency gains through higher tax progressivity. I explore
the empirical potential for this constellation using a model that includes both wage
bargaining and flexible labour supply, so that both sides of the trade-off are cap-
tured. It is calibrated to a set of macroeconomic and institutional parameters of
large OECD countries, and the optimal degree of tax progressivity is numerically
determined.
The most remarkable simulation result is that both at the level of average OECD
parameters and for most of the individual countries, optimal tax progressivity is con-
siderably lower than actual progressivity. At the country level, however, we do not
get uniform picture. In a few countries optimal progressivity is higher than actual
progressivity. The between-country differences can be traced back to differences in
the initial conditions. The effect of the initial unemployment rate is particularly
strong. The higher initial unemployment, the higher optimal tax progressivity. An-
other important driver is the general tax level. High taxes in the initial situation
lead to a lower optimal level of tax progressivity. The initial level of tax progressivity
plays a significant role as well. It affects optimal progressivity through the interaction
with labour supply elasticities.
Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
In der wirtschaftspolitischen Diskussion wird die Progressivität der Einkommen-
steuer vor allem als ein Instrument der Umverteilung gesehen. Je höher die Progres-
sion, desto mehr Umverteilung von Reich zu Arm. Ein hoher Grad der Steuerprogres-
sion bedeutet jedoch auch eine hohe marginale Belastung für Bezieher hoher Einkom-
men. Dies führt zu Verzerrungen des Arbeitsangebots in dieser Gruppe, und in der
Konsequenz zu einem geringeren Umverteilungsvolumen. Bei nicht-wettbewerblicher
Lohnbildung kommt noch ein weiterer Effekt ins Spiel. Eine höhere Steuerprogres-
sion hat dann auch in der Effizienzdimension positive Wirkungen, da sie dämp-
fend auf die Lohnforderungen wirkt und zu niedrigeren Lohnabschlüssen führt. Dies
wirkt den Verzerrungen des Arbeitsangebots entgegen und schafft das Potential eines
gleichzeitigen Gewinns in sowohl der Effizienz- als auch der Verteilungsdimension. In
diesem Papier untersuche ich mit Hilfe eines numerischen Modells, ob dieses Poten-
tial für tatsächliche Volkswirtschaften relevant ist. Das Modell beinhaltet kollektive
Lohnverhandlungen und flexibles Arbeitsangebot, so dass beide abzuwägende Seiten
erfasst sind. Es wird mit Hilfe makroökonomischer und institutioneller Parameter
großer OECD-Volkswirtschaften kalibriert, so dass der optimale Grad der Steuer-
progression numerisch bestimmt werden kann.
Das wichtigste Ergebnis der Simulationsrechnungen ist, dass sowohl im OECD-
Durchschnitt als auch für die meisten individuellen Länder die optimale Progression
deutlich unter der tatsächlichen liegt. Auf der Länder-Ebene ist das Bild allerdings
nicht einheitlich: In einigen Ländern liegt die optimale auch über der tatsächlichen
Progression. Die Unterschiede zwischen den Ländern können auf Unterschiede in den
Ausgangsbedingungen zurückgeführt werden. Dabei ist der Effekt der bestehenden
Arbeitslosigkeit besonder stark. Je höher die Arbeitslosigkeit, desto höher die op-
timale Steuerprogression. Ein zweiter wichtiger Einflussfaktor ist das allgemeine
Steuerniveau. Ein hohes Steuerniveau führt zu einer niedrigen optimalen Progres-
sion. Schließlich spielt auch das Ausgangsniveau der Steuerprogression eine Rolle.
Es beeinflusst die optimale Progression durch die Interaktion mit den Arbeitsange-
botselastizitäten in der Kalibrierung des Modells.
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Abstract
In labour markets with collective wage bargaining higher progressivity of the
labour income tax creates a trade-off. On the one hand, wages are lowered
and unemployment decreases, on the other hand, the individual labour sup-
ply decision is distorted at the hours-of-work margin. The optimal level of
tax progressivity within this trade-off is determined using a numerical general
equilibrium model with imperfect competition on the goods market, collect-
ive wage bargaining and a labour-supply module calibrated to empirically
plausible elasticity values. The model is calibrated to macroeconomic and in-
stitutional parameters of both the OECD average and a number of individual
OECD countries. In most cases the optimal degree of tax progressivity is be-
low the actual level. A decomposition approach shows that the optimal level
is increased by high unemployment and by the general tax level.
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1 Introduction
Income tax progressivity creates an efficiency trade-off in labour markets with col-
lective wage bargaining. On the one hand, higher tax progressivity can reduce unem-
ployment, which leads to a welfare gain. On the other hand, the individual labour
supply decision is distorted, with an associated deadweight loss. In this paper, I
calculate the optimal degree of tax progressivity that results from this trade-off, and
I try to identify the driving forces for differences between OECD countries.
The focus on efficiency issues in the discussion of the income tax needs explan-
ation. In the economic policy debate, income tax progressivity is mostly seen as
a means of redistribution from the rich to the poor. Traditionally, economist have
stressed that efficiency must also be considered in this context. High tax progressivity
leads to labour supply distortions in the high-income group and, as a consequence,
to a shrinking overall potential for redistribution. The derivation of criteria for an
optimum in this situation has been one of the early highlights of optimal taxation
theory (Mirrlees, 1971; Tuomala, 1990).
Since the 1980s, extensive research into wage forming mechanisms that are not
fully competitive has shown that the equity-efficiency trade-off is not clear-cut. There
are positive aspects of tax progressivity in the efficiency dimension as well, because
tax progressivity lowers the incentives for high wage claims and leads to a down-
ward pressure on non-competitive wages. This counteracts the labour supply distor-
tions and creates the potential of a free lunch: simultaneous equity and efficiency
gains through higher tax progressivity. However, this is only a theoretical potential
– whether it is relevant to real-world economies remains a question for empirical
research.
The trade-off within the efficiency dimension has often be addressed using an
analytical approach, but there are hardly any attempts to quantify it. What is the
optimal level of tax progressivity that balances the positive effect of lower unem-
ployment through lower wages with the negative effect on labour supply? This is
the question I investigate in this paper using a calibrated, numerical general equi-
librium model. I adopt the model of collective wage bargaining between a trade
union and an employers’ association. This mechanism is dominant in a number of
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European countries and has most often been chosen to demonstrate the ambiguous
effects of tax progressivity theoretically (Hersoug, 1984; Lockwood and Manning,
1993; Holmlund and Kolm, 1995; Koskela and Vilmunen, 1996).
The numerical model includes both wage bargaining and flexible labour supply,
so that both sides of the trade-off are captured. It is calibrated to a set of macroeco-
nomic and institutional parameters of large OECD countries and solved for the op-
timal degree of tax progressivity. This approach is close in spirit to Sørensen (1999),
which is, to my knowledge, the only paper in the literature that comes up with
a numerically determined optimal degree of tax progressivity. However, Sørensen’s
main focus is on the comparison of different mechanisms of wage determination. To
provide a sharper focus, he chooses a relatively simple calibration of labour supply,
and he fixes the institutional and macroeconomic parameters at stylised values of
a typical Western industrialised country. This is where the present paper comes in.
The calibration of labour supply is elaborated, so that it accounts for different em-
pirical indicators: labour supply elasticities of hours of work and participation, and
with respect to wages as well as to non-wage income.
Why is there only one single paper that tries to quantify the optimal tax pro-
gressivity in a labour market with collective wage bargaining? This is most probably
explained by the fact that to do so, we are forced to leave the area of general and
clear-cut analytical results. No-one has so far come up with illuminating analytical
expressions that characterise the optimal point. For an optimal tax analysis that
involves two tax rates (in our case: the marginal and the average tax on labour in-
come), we need two indicators per tax: its marginal effect on utility, and its marginal
effect on the public budget. The latter soon becomes involved once we include the in-
direct effects through the changes in the tax bases of other taxes (which is necessary
in general equilibrium). It remains possible to derive analytical expressions for these
effects, but they no longer provide an insight in the economic mechanisms. Hence
the shift to numerical models. Here we lose generality, but we may focus directly on
parameters that are quantitatively relevant in the situation at hand. Nevertheless,
the choice in this paper is to limit the analysis to a simple numerical model. The
reason is that once we have identified a parameter that is quantitatively important,
we do not want to stop at this point, but explain why it is important, and why the
effect was qualitatively to be expected, even if we could not foresee that it would
quantitatively drive the results.
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In my attempt to exploit the quantitative potential of the model presented in
this paper, I calibrate it both to unweighted averages of the institutional and macro-
economic parameters of eight large OECD economies and to the individual country
constellations. A decomposition exercise is executed by varying one of the parameters
at a time. This allows us to identify the key drivers of the differences in optimal tax
progressivity.
The most remarkable simulation result is that both at the level of average OECD
parameters and for most of the individual countries, optimal tax progressivity is con-
siderably lower than actual progressivity. At the country level, however, we do not
get a uniform picture. In a few countries optimal progressivity is even higher than ac-
tual progressivity. The between-country differences can be traced back to differences
in the initial conditions. The effect of the initial unemployment rate is particularly
strong. The higher initial unemployment, the higher optimal tax progressivity. An-
other important driver is the general tax level. High taxes in the initial situation
lead to a lower optimal level of tax progressivity. The initial level of tax progressiv-
ity plays a significant role as well. It affects the optimal progressivity through the
interaction with labour supply elasticities. This effect is discussed in detail in the
body of the paper.
The model of this paper is set up to focus on one particular trade-off connec-
ted with tax progressivity, at the cost of a number of other aspects that are not
included. These should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. First, the
quantitative results of the paper do not automatically carry over to other theories of
unemployment (search-and-matching and efficiency wage theories). However, Pissar-
ides (1998) and Sørensen (1999) show that these approaches produce results similar
to the collective bargaining model when they are calibrated to plausible parameter
values and applied to taxation issues. The focus on the collective bargaining model
is therefore not overly restrictive.
Second, there are other distortions, apart from the effect on labour supply, that
run counter to the wage moderating effect of tax progressivity. Examples are Fuest
and Huber (1998), who focus on the distortionary effect on human capital formation,
Kleven and Sørensen (2004), who describe the effects on dual labour markets, where
only one sector is characterised by imperfections, and Koskela and Schöb (2007),
who stress the negative effect on workers’ effort.
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Third, the paper focuses on efficiency issues and abstracts from one core aspect
in the early literature on optimal taxation (Mirrlees, 1971; Tuomala, 1990): non-
observable productivity differences of heterogeneous agents. This can be seen as an
analogue to the Ramsey (1927) approach to indirect taxation, where distributional
concerns are ignored as well, in order to get a clear picture of the efficiency dimension.
Finally, the model of this paper remains at the aggregate level and captures
labour market institutions and the tax and transfer system only by a small set of
macro indicators. Micro econometricians argue that such models miss the very es-
sence of the labour market: heterogeneity. In fact, there are examples of models that
combine microeconomically founded mechanisms of involuntary unemployment and
demographic as well as institutional heterogeneity in the labour market: Sørensen
(1997), Graafland et al. (2001), Aaberge et al. (2004), Arntz et al. (2008). Due to
their complexity, the outcomes of such models are often difficult to explain and to
decompose into effects that are qualitatively known from the theoretical literature.
This interpretation work is simplified through a condensed and simplified “model of
the model” (e.g. “Mini-MIMIC” (Bovenberg et al., 2000) as a complement to Graaf-
land et al., 2001). It is in this tradition that the present paper is most appropriately
placed.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I present the different
parts of the model, my approach to labour supply calibration, the welfare criterion
and the OECD parameters used for the simulations. Sections 3 covers the simulations
for the OECD average, different country specifications and systematic parameter
variations that make a decomposition of the tax progressivity effect possible. In
Section 4, I perform a sensitivity analysis, before Section 5 concludes. The appendix
contains the algebraic details of the labour supply calibration and a list of data
sources.
2 The model
We consider a small, representative production sector with monopolistic competi-
tion in a closed economy. The wage is determined through collective wage bargain-
ing, which produces involuntary unemployment. The government collects taxes on
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consumption, profit and labour income. In this situation, the progressivity of the la-
bour income tax is chosen so as to maximise the expected utility of a representative
worker.
2.1 Consumption
There are four households, indexed by h: the aggregate households of employed (e)
and involuntarily unemployed (u) workers,1 the recipients of residual income (“cap-
italists”, k) and the public household (g). Consumption of these households, Ch, is
composed of a large, but fixed number of symmetric varieties of goods, corresponding
to the number of firms in production, n. The varieties are indexed by i with prices
pi, quantities xi and a uniform consumption tax, tC . The elasticity of substitution
between the individual goods varieties is η.
Ch = n
1
1−η
(
n∑
i=1
(xhi )
η−1
η
) η
η−1
.
This gives demand for individual varieties
xhi =
Ch
n
(
pC
pi(1 + tC)
)η
. (1)
In (1), pC is the consumer price index
pC =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
[pi(1 + tC)]
1−η
) 1
1−η
.
so that
Ch =
Yh
pC
,
where
Ye = w(1− taL)H
Yu = cw(1− taL)H
Yk = (1− tpi)Π
1These are aggregate households because they represent individual households with varying
fixed cost of taking up work (see Section 2.4).
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and Yg is defined in (10). w is the before-tax hourly wage rate, H hours of work, c
the replacement rate (see Section 2.3), Π residual income (“profits”, Π =
∑
pii), and
taL and tpi the average tax rates on labour income and profits, respectively. Adding up
the structurally identical demand from all four households, firm i faces the output
demand function
xi =
C
n
(
pC
pi(1 + tC)
)η
,
where
C = Ce + Cu + Ck + Cg.
2.2 Hours of work
Utility of worker households is assumed to be of the CES type, with consumption,
C, and leisure, F, as arguments and elasticity of substitution σ. The utility of an
employed worker (index e), who freely chooses working time, takes the form
Ue =
[
θC
(
Ce
C¯e
)σ−1
σ
+ (1− θC)
(
Fe
F¯e
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, (2)
where θC is the initial value share of consumption, and C¯ and F¯ are the initial values
of consumption and leisure.2
Ue is maximised subject to the budget constraint
wHe(1− taL) = pCCe,
and the time endowment (T ) constraint,
Fe +He = T.
Tax progressivity is captured by a marginal wage tax rate, tmL , which in general
will differ from the average rate, taL, and has a direct impact on the hours-of-work
decision.3
2This is the “calibrated share form” of the CES function (Rutherford, 1998), which simplifies
calibration by linking the parameters directly to observable values. In the following, a variable
with a bar generally means the value in the initial situation, which is a calibration constant in the
counterfactual simulations.
3Throughout the paper, the tax schedule is only characterised locally by the average and mar-
ginal tax rate. The global form of the schedule (linear progressive, exponential etc.) is left unspe-
cified.
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The share parameter in (2) is expressed relative to extended income, YE,
θC =
p¯CC¯e
Y¯E
.
where extended income includes leisure, valued at the marginal hourly after-tax
wage, w(1− tmL ):
YE = w [He(1− taL) + Fe(1− tmL )] (3)
The outcome of the maximisation are demand functions for consumption and leisure:
Ce
C¯e
= Ue
(
pU
p¯C
pC
)σ
Fe
F¯e
= Ue
(
pU
w¯(1− t¯mL )
w(1− tmL )
)σ
,
where pU is the expenditure function corresponding to (2),
pU =
[
θC
(
pC
p¯C
)1−σ
+ (1− θC)
(
w(1− tmL )
w¯(1− t¯mL )
)1−σ] 11−σ
Appendices A.1.1 and A.1.2 describe how this function is calibrated to empirical
values of labour supply elasticities with respect to income and wage.
2.3 Unemployment
Unemployed workers receive a fixed share of the after tax wage income of the em-
ployed as unemployment benefit. This share is given by the replacement rate, c.
The unemployed have the same utility function as the employed. However, their
consumption and leisure quantities are not determined by optimising choice, but by
the demand restriction they face on the labour market. Utility of the unemployed is
Uu =
[
θC
(
Cu
C¯e
)σ−1
σ
+ (1− θC)
(
Fu
F¯e
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
,
where
Cu =
cw(1− taL)H
pC
and
Fu = (T − H¯) + δH¯. (4)
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In (4), I assume that leisure of the unemployed is less that the full time endowment
(δ < 1). Economically, this reflects the fact that the unemployed must spend a part
of their time for job-seeking and for attending administrative procedures at the social
security agency. In any case, involuntary leisure is not likely to generate the same
utility as the amount of leisure freely chosen by those with a job. In the calibration,
it turns out that for countries with a high replacement rate (see Section 2.9), the
utility of the unemployed is higher than for the employed, if time endowment is
taken as leisure without discount. As a default, I choose δ = 0.5 in (4). In Section
4.2, this choice will be subject to a sensitivity analysis.
2.4 Participation
Households are assumed homogeneous with respect to their labour-leisure choice,
but they differ with respect to their participation decision. This is modelled by
heterogeneity in their fixed cost of taking up work, which generates the separation
between participating and non-participating individuals. Those with low fixed costs
enter the labour market, whereas those with high fixed costs stay at home.4
The two step labour-supply decision (participation, hours of work) is solved
backwards: First, individuals determine the optimal choice of hours assuming that
they participate. Second, they compare their fixed cost of working with the outcome
of the optimal hours choice, taking the presence of involuntary unemployment into
account. In particular, the unemployment-weighted (u) expected utility of supplying
labour, Ul, is relevant for the comparison,
Ul = (1− u)Ue + uUu, (5)
which is the same for all individuals. They compare it with their individual fixed
cost of supplying labour, U0, and supply labour if Ul > U0. The calibration of the
distribution of U0 to an empirical participation elasticity is explained in Appendix
A.1.3.
4See Kleven and Kreiner (2006a) for a general discussion of this approach.
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2.5 Production
The production sector consists of a large and fixed number, n, of symmetrical firms.
Firms are small in the sense that repercussions from their production decisions on
the economy-wide aggregate output and price index may be neglected. All firms
interact in Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977).
Each firm faces a demand curve with elasticity η (see Section 2.1).
For firm i, the demand function takes the form
xi =
X
n
(
P
pi
)η
, (6)
where X and P are communicating aggregate quantity and price indices with
X = n
1
1−η
(
n∑
i=1
(xi)
η−1
η
) η
η−1
P =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
p1−ηi
) 1
1−η
,
and xi and pi are individual quantity and price, respectively. Firm i maximises its
profits
pii = pixi − wiLi
(pii are profits, wi is the wage and Li is employment) in pi, xi and Li subject to (6)
and the production function
xi = AL
α
i ,
treating X, wi and P as exogenous. Profit maximisation results in the first-order
condition
pi = m
wiLi
αxi
, (7)
where m is the mark-up factor (m = η
η−1) applied to marginal output costs (the
fraction term on the right-hand side). (7) fixes the income shares at
sL =
wiLi
pixi
= α(1− 1
η
)
for labour and spi = 1− sL for profits.
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We now consider the symmetrical equilibrium. It is characterised by pi = P,
wi = w, xi =
X
n
and Li = Ln , for all i. Using (7), this means
P = m
wL
αX
.
At this stage, the aggregate producer price level can be normalised: P ≡ 1.
2.6 Wage bargaining
Wage formation is modelled as collective bargaining between a trade union and a
representative firm. More specifically, I assume (i) that bargaining is only about
the wage, not about employment (“right-to-manage” approach)5, (ii) that the trade
union is only concerned with the utility of its employed members (“insider model”)6
and (iii) that hours of work are chosen individually according to the optimisation
in Section 2.2, and are not subject of the collective bargain.7 Wage formation is
conceptualised as the maximisation of a Nash function, Ω, where trade unions are
represented by the utility mark-up over the fallback option, Ue − Ua, and firms by
profits, pi. The relative bargaining power of the trade union, λ, is an unobservable
parameter to be determined in the calibration.
max
w
Ω = [(Ue − Ua)]λ pi (8)
The fallback option of the union, Ua, is composed of possible employment in another
sector, U˜e (with a probability that equals the employment rate), and unemployment
(receiving unemployment benefits, see Section 2.3):
Ua = (1− u)U˜e + uUu
5Sørensen (1999) shows that for the type of numerical analysis intended, the choice between
right-to-manage and efficient bargaining (where bargaining extends also to the number of employed
workers) hardly matters.
6Appendix A.1.4 shows that the results are identical to those obtained with a utilitarian union
as long as the value shares and the elasticities of labour demand and hours supply are constant.
7In the Sørensen (1999) model, it hardly matters quantitatively whether collective bargaining
includes hours of work or not. In the model of this paper – with a CES utility function instead of
additively separable preferences –, including hours of work in the bargaining set-up would mean a
considerable complication of the first-order conditions.
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The fallback option is exogenous in the individual wage bargain, so that the first-
order condition of the maximisation of the Nash function is given as
λ
dUe/dw
Ue − Ua +
dpi/dw
pi
= 0
Both firms and employed workers make optimal choices, given the wage. This allows
us to apply the envelope theorem and express the first-order condition in terms of
partial effects:
λ
∂Ue/∂w
Ue − Ua +
∂pi/∂w
pi
= 0
The individual parts of this expression are evaluated as follows, derived from (2):
∂Ue
∂w
=
∂Ue
∂Ce
∂Ce
∂w
= θC
Ue
Ce
H(1− tmL )
pC
∂pi
∂w
= −L
where L is total labour input, L = HN(1−u). The first order condition thus becomes
λ
θCUeH(1− tmL )
pCCe (Ue − Ua) −
L
pi
= 0 (9)
λ is a parameter that cannot directly be observed. Its value is determined in the
calibration by inverting (9) and solving for λ, given the values of all other variables
in the initial situation (see Appendix A.1.4).
2.7 Public budget
The government collects the following taxes: taxes on wages, profit income, and
consumption, with rates taL, tpi and tC , respectively. The tax revenue is spent for
unemployment benefits and public goods. The government budget constraint reads8
cw(1− taL)L
u
1− u + pCCg = t
a
LwL+ tpiΠ+ tCpCC. (10)
In the counterfactual simulations, the exogenous variation is in the marginal wage
tax, tmL . tc is kept constant, tpi and taL are endogenously adjusted. The role of tpi
is keeping the consumption level of the capitalis household constant, and taL is set
so that the amount of public goods, Cg, is held at its initial level. This is “revenue
neutral” if we keep in mind that tax revenue is corrected by the expenditure for
unemployment benefits.
8For simplicity, I assume that the consumption tax also applies to government consumption.
This does not affect the results.
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2.8 Welfare
The welfare criterion used to determine the optimal degree of tax progressivity is
the ex-ante expected utility of workers who do not yet know whether they will be
employed or unemployed. This is exactly the same indicator that also governs labour
supply at the extensive margin (equation 5),
Ul = (1− u)Ue + uUu.
The focus on the utility of workers is justified by the fact that all other magnitudes
relevant for a welfare assessment – consumption of the capitalists and the con-
sumptive part of the public budget – are kept at their initial level during the sim-
ulations. In the sensitivity analysis, I look also at the case that tpi is fixed and the
welfare of capitalists is disregarded (Section 4.3).
2.9 Calibration to OECD economies
The basic model of Section 2 is calibrated to a set of macroeconomic and institutional
parameters for a number of OECD countries in 2004/5. The data set contains the
six largest European economies: France (FRA), Germany (GER), Great Britain
(GBR), Italy (ITA), Spain (ESP) and the Netherlands (NLD), plus the USA and
Japan (JPN).
These countries are characterised by seven parameters: share of labour in value
added (sL), average tax rates on consumption (tC), labour (taL) and capital (tpi),
coefficient of residual income progression (CRIP)9, unemployment rate (u) and re-
placement rate (c). These parameters are summarised in Table 1 (the exact sources
are given in Appendix A.2). In addition, Table 1 reports the unweighted average
of the parameters over all countries (row “AVR”), which will be used as a starting
point and standard of comparison.
Apart from the country-specific paramters of Table 1, labour supply elasticities
are an important input to calibration. These are assumed uniform across countries:
9The CRIP (coefficient of residual income progression) is defined as the elasticity of after-tax
income with respect to pre-tax income, i.e. (1−tmL )/(1−taL). In a proportional tax regime, the CRIP
is one, and the higher the progressivity of the tax schedule, the lower the CRIP. Jacobsson (1976)
derives theoretical properties of this indicator and justifies its use as a measure of tax progressivity.
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Table 1: OECD parameters
sL tC t
a
L tpi CRIP u c
FRA 0.601 0.182 0.430 0.266 0.910 0.088 0.630
GER 0.593 0.155 0.392 0.131 0.731 0.079 0.570
GBR 0.654 0.162 0.259 0.352 0.862 0.048 0.340
ITA 0.473 0.151 0.427 0.249 0.844 0.096 0.050
JPN 0.594 0.069 0.269 0.198 0.937 0.050 0.070
NLD 0.582 0.210 0.373 0.212 0.849 0.027 0.600
ESP 0.545 0.142 0.340 0.169 0.878 0.129 0.290
USA 0.627 0.041 0.263 0.246 0.933 0.047 0.060
AVR 0.583 0.139 0.344 0.228 0.868 0.071 0.326
elasticity of hours with respect to the after-tax wage (ηHw = 0.1), elasticity of hours
with respect to income (ηLY = −0.1) and elasticity of participation with respect to
the wage (ηNw = 0.2). The choice of the specific values is motivated in Appendices
A.1.1 to A.1.3).
3 Optimal tax progressivity
In this section, I perform numerical simulations to determine the optimal degree
of tax progressivity and identify its driving forces. In Section 3.1, I explain the
determination of the optimal tax progressivity in the “average OECD” model. Then
the driving forces are identified in two sets of numerical exercises. First, starting
from the average values, I vary one parameter at a time to obtain partial effects on
optimal tax progressivity. Second, I run the fully specified country models and check
to what extent the deviations from the average-OECD outcome can be decomposed
into effects of variations in the individual parameters.
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3.1 “Average OECD” model
As a point of reference, I calibrate the basic model of Section 2 to the unweighted
OECD averages for all country-specific parameters (row “AVR” of Table 1). In this
model version, I perform a number of tax variations that allow us to develop a feeling
for the range of tax rates that we expect to be relevant in the model runs to follow.
They are summarised in Figure 1, which shows characteristic tax rate constellations
in the (tmL , taL) space.
Figure 1: Average OECD model: characteristic tax structures
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The upper rightmost point of Figure 1, where the curves “Rev. max. tm” and
“Rev. max. ta” meet, is the point of maximum tax revenue.10 We may call it “Le-
viathan point”, because it is the point a malevolent, exploitative dictator would
choose (taL = 80%, tmL = 75%). The curves “Rev. max. tm” and “Rev. max. ta”
connect the points of partial revenue maxima. “Rev. max. tm” gives the points of
maximum tax revenue when tmL is varied and taL is held fixed at its respective value,
10To be precise: It is the point where tax revenue is maximised through simultaneous variation
of the labour tax parameters taL and t
m
L , taking all general equilibrium interactions into account,
compensating the capitalist by an adjustment of tpi, and treating the value of tC as given.
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i.e. the revenue maximum on each horizontal line through the tax space. “Rev. max.
ta” is the same for taL and tmL exchanged, i.e. the maximum on a vertical line.11
The dot “Initial point” marks our point of departure, taL = 34.4%, tmL = 43.1%
(CRIP= 0.87). Through this point, we draw an iso-budget line (“Iso-budget”). To
the left of the curve of revenue-maximising tmL rates, the iso-budget line will be
downward-sloping. In terms of tax revenue, higher levels of taL are traded off against
higher levels of tmL . At the intersection point, the iso-budget line is horizontal, be-
cause a further increase of tmL does not lead to additional tax revenue any more,
which would allow the tax planner to lower taL as a compensation.12 Consequently,
the initial tax revenue cannot be materialised with taL below 33.9%.
The iso-budget line summarises the set of choice options for the optimal taxation
problem (at given levels of public goods and consumption of the capitalists). It re-
mains to be determined which of these options should be chosen. This is captured by
the “Iso-utility” line, which connects points of the same expected utility of workers,
taking into account all general equilibrium interactions (i.e. adjusting wages and
unemployment rates). It turns out that the iso-utility line is slightly increasing at
its tangency point with the iso-budget line, which is in the upward-sloping range
between the minimum for taL and the initial point. The optimal tmL is 38.3%, almost
five percentage points lower than the initial 43.1%. This gives an optimal CRIP of
0.93, compared to the initial level of 0.87.13 Finally, Figure 1 also shows the point
where total labour input (product of individuals and hours) is maximised on the
iso-budget line. This is considerably far from the utility maximum at a marginal tax
rate of 29.0% and a CRIP of 1.08, i.e. a regressive tax. The reason for this differ-
ence is that additional labour input at the intensive margin is relatively cheap in
welfare terms, while unemployment is expensive. Therefore reducing unemployment
(by higher tax progressivity) is welfare-enhancing even if this does not compensate
the labour volume loss caused by a decrease in hours of work.
11Interestingly, these curves have a positive slope. Usually, two taxes on different goods or factors
of production result in negatively sloped curves. See the figures in Boeters (2004).
12Analogously, the iso-budget curve would be vertical when it meets the “Rev. max. ta” line.
However, in the constellation of Figure 1 this point is not reached with positive levels of tmL .
13This considerably deviates from the optimal CRIP level of 0.72 that Sørensen (1999) obtains in
his model. Additional model runs showed that the income elasticity of labour supply (which is zero
in the Sørensen (1999) model) is the most likely candidate for an explanation of this discrepancy.
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An alternative way of visualising the optimal tax problem is by depicting the
marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) of the taxes involved.14 This is shown in
Figure 2. Here we see that the MCPF of taL is quite stable at a level of about 2,
which indicates a considerable excess burden of taxation. The MCPF of tmL , on
the other hand, behaves rather atypically. On the downward-sloping part of the iso-
budget line, it is negative, because increasing tmL causes both tax revenue and private
welfare to rise. At the lowest point of the iso-budget line at about tmL = 33%, it has
a singularity, because the marginal tax revenue is zero. To the right of this point,
MCPF of tmL is positive, which results from the combination of negative marginal
tax revenue and positive effects on private welfare. This is also the region where
both MCPF curves intersect and we have the welfare maximum at tmL = 38.3%.
Finally, for very high levels of tmL , MCPF again turns slightly negative, because now
the effects on private welfare are also negative.
Figure 2: Average OECD model: Marginal cost of public funds
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14The MCPF has been numerically calculated by using different starting points on the iso-
budget line of Figure 1, changing the respective tax by a small amount, and dividing the negative
monetarised change in expected utility by the additional tax revenue.
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3.2 Systematic parameter variation
Starting from the average OECD parametrisation of Section 3.1, the parameters
that lead to country heterogeneity are now varied systematically. In order to isolate
the effects of the different parameters, I replace, one by one, the average parameter
value with both its minimum and maximum value in all countries considered. This
yields 14 model variations, two for each of the seven parameters. The results of these
model exercises are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2: Systematic parameter variation
minimum maximum
optimal optimal partial
value CRIP value CRIP effect
sL 0.473 (ITA) 0.934 0.654 (GBR) 0.935 0.002
tC 0.041 (USA) 0.915 0.210 (NLD) 0.947 0.188
taL 0.259 (GBR) 0.907 0.430 (FRA) 0.961 0.316
tpi 0.131 (GER) 0.934 0.352 (GBR) 0.934 0.000
CRIP 0.731 (GER) 0.802 0.937 (JPN) 0.998 0.952
u 0.027 (NLD) 1.180 0.129 (ESP) 0.777 -3.944
c 0.050 (ITA) 0.946 0.630 (FRA) 0.839 -0.184
Table 2 shows the minimum and maximum value of each of the parameters in the
dataset, the respective country and the resulting optimal degree of tax progressivity.
For the interpolation of the country results, I assume that the effects of the individual
parameters are linear and additive. This allows us to calculate partial effects, which
are shown in the last column of Table 2. Take the partial effect for tC (0.188) as an
example. It may be interpreted in the following way: A one-percentage-point increase
in the consumption tax rate leads to a value of the optimal CRIP that is about 0.2
percentage point higher. The spread between the optimal CRIP for the minimum
and maximum value of a coefficient is informative with respect to the relevance of the
respective coefficient for explaining country differences. A parameter is particularly
relevant if there actually is variation between countries and its partial effect is high.
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Interpreted in this way, Table 2 shows that most “action” is in the CRIP and the
unemployment rate.15
3.3 Explaining cross-country differences
In which way can the results from the systematic parameter variation be used to
explain cross-country differences? Table 3 shows the actual and the optimal CRIP
for all countries. Row “deviation” reports the difference between the optimal country-
specific CRIP and the optimum in the average OECD model (0.93). This difference is
“explained” by the deviations of all parameters from their OECD averages, multiplied
with the partial effects from Table 2.
Table 3: Cross-country differences
FRA GER GBR ITA JPN NLD ESP USA
CRIP
actual 0.910 0.731 0.862 0.844 0.937 0.849 0.878 0.933
optimal 0.838 0.747 0.999 0.869 1.041 1.093 0.789 1.038
deviationa -0.096 -0.188 0.065 -0.066 0.107 0.158 -0.145 0.103
Partial effects
sL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
tC 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.002 -0.013 0.013 0.001 -0.018
taL 0.027 0.015 -0.027 0.026 -0.024 0.009 -0.001 -0.026
tpi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CRIP 0.040 -0.130 -0.006 -0.023 0.065 -0.018 0.009 0.062
u -0.069 -0.034 0.089 -0.101 0.081 0.172 -0.231 0.093
c -0.056 -0.045 -0.003 0.051 0.047 -0.050 0.007 0.049
Sum -0.050 -0.190 0.058 -0.044 0.157 0.125 -0.215 0.160
aDeviation from the optimal CRIP in the “OECD average” model (0.934).
The fit is not perfect, but fairly good. The R2 of this exercise (when interpreting,
without any statistical implication, the partial effects as regression coefficients) is
15The surprising fact that actual initial progressivity has a strong effect on optimal progressivity
is discussed in Sections 3.4 and 4.1.
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0.88, which means that the assumption of additive, linear effects is justified. As it
stands, the regression may be read in the following way: Low optimal progressivity
in the Netherlands and Great Britain is mostly driven by low unemployment rates.
Reversely, high unemployment in Spain makes a high degree of tax progressivity
desirable. In contrast to these countries, high optimal tax progressivity in Germany
is mostly driven by the low initial CRIP. Low optimal tax progressivity in the USA
and Japan is explained by a combination of relatively low unemployment and a high
initial CRIP.
The decomposition results thus confirm what we saw in Table 2. The largest
contribution to the explanation of the effects comes from the unemployment rate
and the CRIP. The contributions of the replacement rate, the consumption tax and
the average wage tax are smaller. The value share of labour and the profit tax are
negligible.
3.4 Interpretation of the regression coefficients
Until this point, the analysis has been mainly descriptive. It can be shown by system-
atic parameter variation that differences in the degree of optimal tax progressivity
between countries are to a large extent driven by variations in the unemployment
rate and initial tax progressivity. But also the level of other taxes and the replace-
ment rate play a role. How are these effects explained economically?
Most straightforward is the effect of unemployment on optimal tax progressiv-
ity. Recall that the positive welfare effects of higher tax progressivity are driven by
the wage-depressing and unemployment-reducing forces of higher tax progressivity
in wage bargaining. The higher the initial unemployment level, the higher (in per-
centage points) is the reduction in unemployment through a given increase in tax
progressivity, and the more people benefit from this by switching into employment.
Therefore, countries with a high unemployment level have higher optimal tax pro-
gressivity. In the opposite extreme case, if there is no (or very low) unemployment,
there is nothing to be gained from increasing tax progressivity, while there is still
the distortionary effect on labour supply.
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If we want to explain the effect of the existing levels of taL, and tC on optimal tax
progressivity16 (the higher these levels, the lower optimal tax progressivity), we need
an intermediate step. It is important to know that choosing the utility-maximising
point on the iso-budget line in Figure 1 is quite distinct from maximising the total
labour input.17 The labour input maximum is considerably farther to the left of
the utility-maximising point (at tmL = 29.0%). In moving from here to the right,
labour input decreases, i.e., the employment of additional workers (reduction in
unemployment) is over-compensated by the loss in hours per person employed. This
is in fact welfare-enhancing, because the employed are much closer to their labour-
leisure optimum than the unemployed. Thus, an hour of work of someone formerly
unemployed is worth more than an hour lost of someone who was and remains
employed. However, this trade-off is altered by the existing taxes. If there are taxes,
a loss in employment also means a loss in tax revenue, which must be compensated
if the government’s budget is to remain balanced. Therefore, the volume of labour
input carries more weight in the welfare trade-off if taxes are high. The higher the
taxes, the closer we remain to the labour input maximum, i.e., the less we move
towards higher tax progressivity.
The effect of the replacement rate takes place via the public budget as well.
A high replacement rate means high budgetary costs of unemployment. Reducing
unemployment thus becomes more attractive. We have an additional positive effect
on the public budget, which translates into compensatory adjustments of taL, which
modifies the trade-off in the direction of higher tax progressivity.
We are left with the effect of the initial CRIP on the optimal CRIP, which is
large and positive. An increase in the initial CRIP translates almost one-to-one into
an increase in the optimal CRIP. This is strange at first sight. How is it possible
that the initial level of one variable determines its own optimal value? If we want to
understand this effect, we need to go back to the calibration of the utility function
to the elasticity of labour supply at the intensive margin (see Appendix A.1.2). For
given (distribution and substitution) parameters of the utility function, an increase
in tax progressivity that the agent faces would lead to a higher labour supply elasti-
16The level of tpi has no effect, because it is adjusted in the simulations.
17In the model of this paper, the labour input maximum coincides with the output maximum
and the maximum of tax revenue from the consumption tax.
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city. For this very reason the marginal wage tax rate becomes the more distortive
the higher it is. However, we calibrate utility functions in all countries to the same
wage elasticity of labour supply. This means that for countries with high initial pro-
gressivity (used for calibration), this effect must be counterbalanced by parameters
that work in the direction of a low elasticity (namely, a low elasticity of substitution
between consumption and leisure). Controlled for tax progressivity, labour supply
is therefore less elastic in countries with high initial tax progressivity. This in turn
means that the negative effects of higher tax progressivity are less severe, so that
optimal tax progressivity follows actual progressivity.
The argument in the previous paragraph allows us to trace back the effect to
the calibration of labour supply and makes it seem less strange than it was in the
beginning. Most importantly, we must not interpret the effect as causal. Of course,
governments cannot change the level of the optimal tax progressivity just by chan-
ging progressivity itself. It is plausible, however, to interpret the effect as indicative.
If it is the case that in certain countries the same level of labour supply elasticity
is reached only at higher degrees of tax progressivity, governments can exploit this
fact in setting the tax schedule. Politicians find by trial and error that making taxes
more progressive is not too distorting. This leads to higher tax progressivity in these
countries, which in turn drives labour supply elasticities up to a level which is close
to the average of other countries. The regression results suggest that governments
are relatively good in implicitly adjusting the tax rates to the specific labour market
conditions they face.
However, against the background of the results in this section, we must recon-
sider the question of whether it is a good idea to assume identical labour supply
elasticities in all countries. Section 4.1 explores an alternative way of calibrating the
utility functions, which allows for differences in the labour supply elasticities across
countries.
4 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, I check the model results for robustness by exploring three themes
that have emerged in the discussion so far. Is it possible to decouple the actual and
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the optimal level of tax progressivity by changing the calibration of labour supply?
(Section 4.1) To what extent do the results depend on the choice of the (arbitrary)
parameter that determines the valuation of involuntary leisure? (Section 4.2) What
effect has the adjustment of the profit tax rate on the results? (Section 4.3)
4.1 Calibration of labour supply elasticity
The fact that initial tax progressivity plays an important role in determining optimal
progressivity, is explainable, but needs a closer inspection. This was the conclusion
at the end of Section 3.4. The critical step that leads to this result is calibrating the
utility function in all countries to the same values of the labour supply elasticities
at the intensive margin (with respect to income, ηLY , and with respect to the wage,
ηHw). These exogenous elasticity values can only be combined with different levels
of the tax rates, taL and tmL , if the parameters of the utility function, θC , σ and T, are
allowed to vary across countries. This is shown in the left hand panel of Table 4. The
calibrated elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure varies between
1.73 and 1.93. It moves in parallel with the CRIP (see Table 1).18 So countries with
low initial tax progressivity have a low elasticity of substitution, which weakens
labour supply responses at the intensive margin and makes tax progressivity more
attractive. This is exactly what produces the large regression coefficient for the CRIP
in Section 3.2.
What if we instead treated σ as the deeper parameter that does not change across
countries? The right hand panel of Table 4 shows this case. To arrive at the elasticity
values displayed, I have taken the average OECD model as point of departure, and
then – with fixed σ and θC – implemented the country-specific parameters19 as a
counterfactual. The resulting elasticity values are displayed in columns “ηLY ” and
“ηHw”. We see that high tax progressivity (GER) now leads to high absolute values
of the elasticities, and conversely (low progressivity in JPN and USA). The values
of ηLY and ηHw from Table 4 are in turn used to re-calibrate the model at the initial
point. This leads to a slight adjustment of θC , because the value share of leisure is
18With the elasticity values chosen as exogenous, σ happens to be precisely 1 + CRIP.
19The only exception is the unemployment rate, which cannot be imposed on the model as an
exogenous parameter.
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not constant with a CES function.20
Table 4: Calibration of labour supply
ηLY , ηHw exogenous σ exogenous
θC σ T θC ηLY ηHw T
FRA 0.909 1.910 1.110 0.911 -0.098 0.094 1.107
GER 0.927 1.731 1.108 0.898 -0.140 0.159 1.156
GBR 0.914 1.862 1.109 0.925 -0.086 0.087 1.093
ITA 0.916 1.844 1.109 0.886 -0.135 0.138 1.152
JPN 0.906 1.937 1.110 0.928 -0.077 0.071 1.083
NLD 0.915 1.849 1.109 0.908 -0.109 0.111 1.120
ESP 0.912 1.878 1.110 0.910 -0.103 0.101 1.113
USA 0.907 1.933 1.110 0.933 -0.072 0.067 1.077
AVR 0.913 1.868 1.110 0.913 -0.100 0.100 1.110
If we repeat the exercise of Sections 3.2 and 3.3 with the alternative method of
labour supply calibration, we obtain the regression coefficients listed in Table 5.
Comparing Tables 5 and 2, we see that the coefficient of the CRIP is actu-
ally reduced to less than half of its former value. It remains positive, however. In
compensation, the coefficients of tC and taL have increased substantially and the coef-
ficient of sL has turned negative. This is reflected in the revised decomposition in
Table 6. For the CRIP, the explanatory contribution is significantly reduced, while
it remains high for the unemployment rate and increases for taL.
The fact that the coefficient of the CRIP is still positive comes unexpected,
given that the set-up of this section was aimed at correcting for this effect. The
most probable explanation is based on the interaction between tax progressivity and
unemployment. Higher initial tax progressivity induces lower initial unemployment.
20Unfortunately, the clear-cut distinction between calibration and simulation breaks down at
this point. The different values of ηLY and ηHw do not only depend on taL and t
m
L , but also on the
deviation of H from its initial value. This, in turn, depends on the wage and is only determined in
full equilibrium.
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Table 5: Partial effects with alternative labour supply calibration
minimum maximum
optimal optimal partial
value CRIP value CRIP effect
sL 0.473 (ITA) 0.963 0.654 (GBR) 0.917 -0.254
tC 0.041 (USA) 0.901 0.210 (NLD) 0.956 0.328
taL 0.259 (GBR) 0.889 0.430 (FRA) 0.985 0.560
tpi 0.131 (GER) 0.934 0.352 (GBR) 0.934 0.000
CRIP 0.731 (GER) 0.877 0.937 (JPN) 0.959 0.399
u 0.027 (NLD) 1.180 0.129 (ESP) 0.777 -3.944
c 0.050 (ITA) 0.948 0.630 (FRA) 0.835 -0.195
As unemployment is a separate regressor, the total effect of initial tax progressivity
is decomposed into the (positive) direct effect captured by the parameter in Table
5 and the (negative) indirect effect via unemployment. Added up, these two effects
might well be zero. However, performing such a check would require a separation
of tax-progressivity-induced unemployment from unemployment caused by other
country-specific conditions. I have not succeeded in finding a separation method
that is consistent with the calibration of the wage bargaining system (Appendix
A.1.4) and leave it therefore at this qualitative discussion.
Without further empirical analysis of differences in labour supply elasticities
across countries, it cannot be decided which of the two calibration variants is to
be preferred. At a first glance, having initial tax progressivity determining optimal
progressivity seems dubious. However, given the results of this section, the argument
from the end of Section 3.4 can be reinforced: If it is really the case that countries
with higher tax progressivity have the same labour supply elasticities as countries
with low progressivity, the effect is not unreasonable. It must be interpreted as
an indicative rather than a causal effect, however. Cross-country differences in tax
progressivity reflect differences in labour supply conditions that would surface if
taxes were the same everywhere.
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Table 6: Cross-country differences with alternative labour supply calibration
FRA GER GBR ITA JPN NLD ESP USA
CRIP
actual 0.910 0.731 0.862 0.844 0.937 0.849 0.878 0.933
optimal 0.834 0.800 0.969 0.946 0.976 1.097 0.793 0.961
deviationa -0.100 -0.134 0.035 0.011 0.041 0.162 -0.141 0.027
Partial effects
sL -0.005 -0.002 -0.018 0.028 -0.003 0.000 0.010 -0.011
tC 0.014 0.005 0.008 0.004 -0.023 0.023 0.001 -0.032
tL 0.048 0.027 -0.048 0.047 -0.042 0.016 -0.002 -0.046
tpi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CRIP 0.017 -0.055 -0.002 -0.009 0.027 -0.008 0.004 0.026
u -0.069 -0.034 0.089 -0.101 0.081 0.172 -0.231 0.093
c -0.059 -0.047 -0.003 0.054 0.050 -0.053 0.007 0.052
Sum 0.054 -0.106 0.026 0.022 0.091 0.150 -0.211 0.082
aDeviation from the optimal CRIP in the “OECD average” model (0.934).
To my knowledge there is no example of a meta-analysis of labour supply elasti-
cities in the literature that takes tax progressivity as a regressor.21 We thus remain
agnostic about the relative performance of the two calibration methods. All we can
say is that the sign of the effects does not depend on the approach chosen.22
4.2 Utility from involuntary leisure
In Section 2.3, we have seen that we are left with one free parameter in the calib-
ration, which cannot be empirically founded: the utility from involuntary leisure, δ.
The value of δ cannot be one, because then – given the specification of utility as
a CES function of consumption and leisure and given empirically plausible values
of the elasticities of labour supply – the unemployed would be better off than the
21Evers et al. (2005), e.g., has no regressors that capture institutions of the countries the studies
reviewed are about.
22The only exception is the value share of labour, but this effect is small, anyway.
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employed.23 In the light of the discussion on a “poverty trap”, this might even be
realistic at least for a subset of individuals. However, it is not consistent with the
wage bargaining set-up, which is based on the assumption that trade unions bargain
over a wage that gives the employed utility on top of what they would have if they
were unemployed.
In Section 2.3, I apply an ad-hoc solution to this problem by assuming that
involuntary leisure gives only half the utility of leisure chosen voluntarily (δ = 0.5).
Now I investigate to what extent the results are sensitive to this assumption. As an
alternative, extreme choice, I set the utility-of-involuntary-leisure parameter to zero
(δ = 0). We might think of an unemployment benefit system that requires benefit
recipients to work full-time in some public services. The consequences of this change
are listed in Table 7 (with the same set-up as Table 2).
Table 7: Partial effects with utility of involuntary leisure set to zero
minimum maximum
optimal optimal partial
value CRIP value CRIP effect
sL 0.473 (ITA) 0.922 0.654 (GBR) 0.922 0.002
tC 0.041 (USA) 0.900 0.210 (NLD) 0.935 0.204
taL 0.259 (GBR) 0.892 0.430 (FRA) 0.951 0.343
tpi 0.131 (GER) 0.922 0.352 (GBR) 0.922 0.000
CRIP 0.731 (GER) 0.791 0.937 (JPN) 0.984 0.939
u 0.027 (NLD) 1.166 0.129 (ESP) 0.764 -3.940
c 0.050 (ITA) 0.936 0.630 (FRA) 0.879 -0.098
Comparing Tables 2 and 7 shows that optimal tax progressivity is higher (lower
CRIP) across the board.24 This is a plausible outcome. Through the lower valuation
of involuntarily leisure utility differences between the employed and the unemployed
23Strictly speaking, this only applies to countries with a high replacement rate.
24There is a single exception from this general picture: The optimal tax progressivity for the
maximum value of the replacement rate, c, goes down instead of up. The mechanism is intricate.
If the replacement rate is high, the most important mechanism is that unemployment affects the
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become larger. Hence larger gains in expected utility are achieved by reducing un-
employment. And higher tax progressivity is the means to generate this outcome.
The change in the level of optimal tax progressivity is almost uniform across all
model variations. This means that the marginal effects, captured by the regression
coefficients, remain almost the same as in the main variant of the model. The unem-
ployment rate and initial tax progressivity remain the most important determinants
of optimal tax progressivity.
4.3 No adjustment of the profit tax
In the counterfactual simulations of Section 3, we have assumed that the profit tax
is adjusted so as to keep the consumption level of the capitalists at a constant level.
This allows us to restrict ourselves on the expected utility of workers in the welfare
analysis, because these are the only households that experience welfare changes.
However, a coordinated adjustment of profit and labour income taxes is not particu-
lar realistic as a policy scenario (at least not in the way assumed in the simulations:
that capitalists are compensated for the indirect effects from the labour tax reform).
To put the simulations into perspective, I run them once again without the adjust-
ment of the profit tax, and disregarding the income changes of the capitalists. This
can be given two different interpretations: either all capital is owned by foreigners,
whose welfare does not enter the target function of the domestic government. Or we
consider the case of a “labourist” government, which only cares about the welfare of
workers.
Table 8 shows the results of the decomposition analysis. Disregarding welfare
changes for the capitalist has a general level effect on optimal tax progressivity:
Optimal tax progressivity is higher than in the base case, because capitalist need
not to be compensated for the income losses they suffer when we move away from
the labour-input-maximising point in Figure 1. In the “average OECD” model, the
utility of the employed through the adjustments of taL necessary to compensate the public budget
for unemployment benefit payments. It turns out that with lower valuation of unemployed time,
the reductions in unemployment through higher tax progressivity are slightly lower than in the
main variant. This pushes the effect in the opposite direction.
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optimal CRIP is now at 0.85 (compared to 0.93 in the base case with compensation).
Interestingly, this is almost exactly equal to the actual CRIP of 0.87.
Table 8: Systematic parameter variation
minimum maximum
optimal optimal partial
value CRIP value CRIP effect
sL 0.473 (ITA) 0.819 0.654 (GBR) 0.870 0.286
tC 0.041 (USA) 0.812 0.210 (NLD) 0.875 0.371
taL 0.259 (GBR) 0.814 0.430 (FRA) 0.890 0.443
tpi 0.131 (GER) 0.837 0.352 (GBR) 0.869 0.147
CRIP 0.731 (GER) 0.742 0.937 (JPN) 0.903 0.780
u 0.027 (NLD) 1.036 0.129 (ESP) 0.722 -3.075
c 0.050 (ITA) 0.855 0.630 (FRA) 0.786 -0.119
The partial effects of Table 8 are in a similar range to the base case (Table
2). Some quantitative changes need comment, however. The coefficient of the value
share of labour (sL) is now positive. This is plausible, because the higher the share
of labour, the lower profits and the smaller the external effect on capitalists, which
works in favour of high tax progressivity. The partial effects of the tax rates (tC ,
taL, and, for the first time, tpi itself) are stronger. This is a tax-base effect. We are
farther away from the labour-input maximum. The tax base for the wage tax is
therefore smaller. A given tax revenue loss from shrinking economic activity (which
is the higher the higher the tax rates) now requires a larger adjustment of the average
wage tax. This makes additional tax progressivity, which produces tax revenue losses,
less attractive.
Table 9 shows the decomposition for the individual countries. sL and tpi now
enter the picture with contributions to the explanation of deviations from the OECD
average. However, as their coefficients are not particularly large and cross-country
variation is moderate for these variables, the overall qualitative pattern remains
unchanged.
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Table 9: Cross-country differences
FRA GER GBR ITA JPN NLD ESP USA
CRIP
actual 0.910 0.731 0.862 0.844 0.937 0.849 0.878 0.933
optimal 0.807 0.700 0.930 0.786 0.883 1.006 0.717 0.895
deviationa -0.045 -0.152 0.078 -0.066 0.031 0.154 -0.135 0.043
Partial effects
sL 0.005 0.003 0.020 -0.031 0.003 -0.001 -0.011 0.012
tC 0.016 0.006 0.009 0.005 -0.026 0.026 0.001 -0.036
taL 0.038 0.021 -0.038 0.037 -0.033 0.013 -0.002 -0.036
tpi 0.006 -0.014 0.018 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.009 0.003
CRIP 0.032 -0.107 -0.005 -0.019 0.054 -0.015 0.008 0.051
u -0.054 -0.026 0.069 -0.078 0.063 0.134 -0.180 0.072
c -0.036 -0.029 -0.002 0.033 0.030 -0.033 0.004 0.032
Sum 0.007 -0.146 0.072 -0.051 0.087 0.122 -0.188 0.097
aDeviation from the optimal CRIP in the “OECD average” model without tpi compensation (0.852).
5 Conclusions
The model of the paper is used to analyse the determinants of optimal tax progressiv-
ity in a labour market with collective wage bargaining and flexible labour supply.
The framework chosen is simple enough to keep an overview over the basic mechan-
isms, but has sufficient complexity to be calibrated to a number of behavioural and
macroeconomic parameters, partly universal, partly country-specific.
In particular, the following parameters are used to adjust the model to country-
specific conditions: factor shares in value added, important macroeconomic tax
quotas (consumption tax, labour tax, capital tax), unemployment rates, tax pro-
gressivity and replacement rate. In addition, three behavioural parameters were
taken into account: wage elasticity of labour supply at the intensive and at the
extensive margin, and income elasticity of labour supply.
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When calibrated to average OECD values, the model produces the following
results:
• Optimal tax progressivity is lower than actual progressivity. Moving to the
optimal point would mean a five percent cut in the marginal wage tax, which
would allow for half a percent compensating decrease in the average wage tax.
• The optimal tax structure is located in the region where increasing the mar-
ginal labour tax produces negative tax revenue.
• The optimal tax structure is considerably far away from the point of max-
imum labour input. This is because an labour input gain through lower un-
employment has more value (in welfare terms) than labour input losses at the
hours-of-work margin.
There is considerable cross-country variation both in actual and optimal tax pro-
gressivity. A decomposition approach shows that approximating the general effect
by linear additive effects of the seven country-specific parameters gives a reasonable
fit, where:
• Higher initial unemployment leads to higher optimal tax progressivity, because
unemployment reduction effects are approximately proportional to the initial
level.
• A higher general tax level leads to lower optimal tax progressivity, because
the tax revenue losses when departing from the employment maximum, which
must be compensated through a higher average labour tax, are higher.
• Initial tax progressivity affects optimal progressivity. The extent of this effect
depends on the exogeneity assumptions in the calibration. If labour supply
elasticities are assumed to be exogenous and constant across countries, the
effect it large. If the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure
is considered a “deep”, constant parameter, the effect is considerably smaller.
This last point may be translated into a first indication of where the results may be
refined in future work. A careful meta-study on labour supply elasticities could
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explore which parameters of an underlying utility function should most reason-
ably be considered to be “deep” constants. Such an approach could re-establish the
calibration-simulation dichotomy, which becomes blurred in the alternative labour
supply calibration of Section 4.1.
There are other points where the analysis of this paper potentially can be im-
proved upon. The wage bargaining model used does not have a sufficient number of
parameters25 to be calibrated to empirical estimates of wage equations. There are
problems at the other end of the model-empirics match as well. Empirical wage curve
estimates turn out to be very unstable, so that it is difficult to find a good standard
of comparison (Folmer, 2009). Nevertheless, it could be illuminating to replace the
wage bargaining equation in the model with wage curves that are more similar to
empirical specifications. Other aspects that could be integrated in the model in a
straightforward manner are interactions between different skill types of workers and
international capital mobility, which both are likely to have an impact on the results.
However, here we approach the grey area of “real” applied models. These focus on
institutional detail at the cost of more and more intertwined economic effects that
can only be disentangled with great effort. For a recent example of such a model
with different skill types, labour supply reactions at the micro level, a differentiated
sectoral structure and mobile capital, see Boeters and Feil (2009).
Finally, if we put aside all doubts about the working mechanisms of the model
and take the levels of optimal tax progressivity that we obtain at face value, we
may proceed to a question of political economy: What might explain the deviations
of actual tax progressivity from the level characterised as “optimal” in this study?
Given that there are deviations in both directions, this is not an easy question to
answer. The results of the paper apply to a representative ex-ante worker and do not
capture distributional considerations. Governments with large redistributive ambi-
tions are likely to choose more progressive tax schedules than the “optimal” ones of
this paper. On the other hand, if the actual tax policy in a country is determined
by labour market insiders, whose unemployment risk is lower than the average un-
employment rate, this would lead to less tax progressivity than the reference values
25Actually, there is one free parameter, the value of involuntarily unemployed time. The effect
of this parameter on the results is small (see Section 4.2), so that it cannot be used to tune the
bargaining equations to empirically estimated wage curve elasticities.
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of this paper. It might be an interesting line of research to see whether empirical in-
dicators of redistribution willingness or insider power in unions are better correlated
with deviations between actual and optimal tax progressivity than with actual tax
progressivity itself. But considering the small size of the potential dataset and the
many additional assumptions that enter the calculations of the optimal tax rates, it
would be a surprise if such an empirical analysis produced strong, significant results.
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Appendix
A.1 Calibration
A.1.1 Income elasticity of labour supply
Originating from the homothetic CES function (2), the demand functions are ho-
mogeneous of degree one in disposable extended income. We thus have26
εFe,YE = 1.
From this we can derive the income elasticity of labour supply. To be precise, we
add a small amount of non-labour income, Y0 to the extended income in (3)
YE = w [H(1− taL) + Fe(1− tmL )] + Y0,
and calculate the per cent change of labour supply with respect to a variation in Y0
that would increase Y = wH(1− taL) + Y0 by one percent, if labour supply did not
react.
ηHY := εH,Y =
∂H
∂Y0
Y
H
= εH,FeεF,Ye
∂YE
∂Y0
Ye
YE
We have
εH,Fe = −
T −H
H
εF,Ye =
∂YE
∂Y0
= 1
and therefore
ηLY = −T −H
H
Ye
YE
= −T −H
H
wH(1− taL)
w [H(1− taL) + (T −H)(1− tmL )]
ηLY is a parameter that can be observed empirically, and we use it to determine
T, the (unobservable, disposable) time endowment. Solving for T, as a multiple of
initial labour supply, gives
T
H
=
(1− taL)− ηLY (tm − taL)
(1− taL) + ηLY (1− tmL )
= 1− ηLY (1− t
a
L)
ηLY (1− tmL ) + (1− taL)
(11)
26εx,y is used as a shorthand for the elasticity ∂ log x∂ log y .
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For small, negative values of ηLY (following Ballard (2000), I take -0.1 as the default
value), T > L is warranted. At the same time, small absolute values of ηLY will result
in a small amount of disposable leisure. In the case of proportional taxes (tmL = taL),
(11) reduces to
T
L
= 1− ηLY
1 + ηLY
=
1
1 + ηLY
(12)
For ηLY = −0.1, we thus arrive at T ≈ 1.1. This may seem overly little: only 4 hours
of disposable leisure in relation to a standard work week of 40 hours. In ad-hoc
specifications, one rather finds values between 1.5 and 2. However, this would lead
to income elasticities of labour supply which are far beyond what we empirically
observe. This point has forcefully been made by Ballard (2000).
A.1.2 Wage elasticity of labour supply
With the time endowment determined by the income elasticity of labour supply, we
proceed with calibrating the value of the elasticity of substitution between material
consumption and leisure, using the wage elasticity of labour supply (to be precise:
the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the marginal after-tax wage), ηHw.
This is calculated as
ηHw = εH,w˜ = −T −H
H
εH,w˜,
where w˜ = w(1− tmL ). The elasticity of leisure demand with respect to the marginal
after-tax wage can be decomposed into a substitution effect and an income effect:
ηHw = −T −H
H
[
−σθC − (1− θC) + w(1− t
m
L )T
YE
]
Solving for σ gives
σ =
ηHw − T−HH
(
(1− θC)− w(1−t
m
L )T
YE
)
T−H
H
θC
, (13)
which is our calibration equation. To develop a feeling for magnitudes, we again
consider the special case with tmL = taL = tL. Then we have
w(1− tL)T
YE
= 1
and (13) simplifies to
σ =
ηHw +
T−H
H
θC
T−H
H
θC
= 1 +
ηHw
T−H
H
θC
(14)
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Further simplification of (14) is achieved by observing that in this case
θC =
H
T
,
which yields27
σ = 1 +
T
T −HηHw
Finally, we insert (12), which leaves us with
σ = 1− ηHw
ηHY
This shows that the inclusion of ηLY in the calibration makes the outcome for σ
more volatile. With an exogenous, relatively large T/H ratio, a small value of ηLw
would have warranted a small deviation of σ from one.28 With ηLY additionally
appearing in the equation, σ may easily assume much higher values. The default
elasticity values, ηLw = 0.1 and ηLY = −0.1, produce σ = 2.
A.1.3 Elasticity of participation
The distribution of the U0’s over the population must be calibrated. We have the
actual participation rate and the elasticity of labour supply at the extensive margin
as our empirical basis. This is sufficient to calibrate the distribution of the fixed
costs locally (at the point of actual participation), but not globally. The rest of
the distribution must be fixed by some functional assumption. We assume that
fixed costs are uniformly distributed between U−0 and U
+
0 . For fixing the values of
these bounds, we first have to calculate the change in Ul produced by an exogenous
variation in the wage. We consider the case of an isolated change in the wage of the
respective individual in the case of employment. In this case, the unemployment rate
and the utility in case of unemployment may be considered constant. This would
not be the case for a general change in the wage, which applies to all individuals. In
27This is also what you have in Rutherford (1998), if you leave out the upper nest with the
consumption-savings decision (assuming that the savings ratio is zero).
28I follow Sørensen (1999) and assume a value of 0.1 for ηLw. The meta study of Evers et al.
(2005) suggests a somewhat higher elasticity, but it is difficult to distil a “core” value from this
study.
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terms of elasticities, we then have
εUl,w =
(1− u)Ue
Ul
εUe,w =
(1− u)Ue
Ul
(εYe,w − εpU ,w)
=
(1− u)Ue
Ul
(
wT (1− tmL )
Ye
− wFe(1− t
m
L )
Ye
)
=
(1− u)Ue
Ul
wH(1− tmL )
Ye
The elasticity of labour supply at the extensive margin (N is the number of parti-
cipating persons) is calculated as
ηNw = εN,UlεUl,w = h
(1− u)Ue
N
wH(1− tmL )
Ye
,
where h is the density of the fixed cost distribution. Solved for h, we get
h = ηNw
NYe
(1− u)UewH(1− tmL )
.
This is evaluated at the initial point, with ηNw set to 0.2, following Kleven and
Kreiner (2006b).29 h is then treated as a constant in the counterfactual simulations.
This means that the elasticity at the extensive margin is precisely reproduced only
for the initial point; off the initial situation, it is endogenous.
The bounds of the uniform distribution for h are determined as
U−0 = U¯l −
N¯
h
U+0 = U¯l +
N0 − N¯
h
where N0 is the total population and N¯ is initial participation. Finally, counterfac-
tual participation is calculated as
N = N¯ + h(Ul − U¯l)
29Kleven and Kreiner (2006b, p.18-20) survey the current state of empirical evidence on the
elasticity at the extensive margin. It is particularly difficult to calibrate a model with a represent-
ative agent to these elasticities, because they differ considerably by household type. The value of
0.2 is the aggregate average in Kleven and Kreiner’s core scenario.
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A.1.4 Nash bargaining equation
From the Nash bargaining equation (8),
max
w
Ω = (Ue − Ua)λpi,
we derive the first-order condition
Ω
w
= λεUe,w
Ue
Ue − Ua −
wL
pi
= 0. (15)
Assuming that the initial state is an equilibrium, (15) must hold and the value of λ
is determined as
λ =
w¯L¯
p¯iε¯Ue,w
U¯e − U¯a
U¯e
.
Given that the income shares of labour and profits are constant in a Cobb-Douglas
world, (15) boils down to the condition
εUe,w
Ue
Ue − Ua = const. (16)
We might have started out with a utilitarian union instead, which also considers the
level of employment. Then the Nash function would be
Ω′ = [(Ue − Ua)N ]λ pi,
and the corresponding first-order condition
εΩ′,w = λ
(
εUe,w
Ue
Ue − Ua + εL,w − εH,w
)
− wL
pi
= 0, (17)
where the additional terms are the elasticities of employment, L, and hours, H with
respect to the wage. As long as these are constant or almost constant, we would
essentially be back at (16), although λ has a different value now.
One could also try more general Nash functions with variable weights for indi-
vidual utility and employment, such aslike
max
w
Ω =
[
(Ue − U¯)µN (1−µ)
]λ
pi,
which includes both the utilitarian union (µ = 0.5) and the insider model of (8)
with µ = 1 (see Graafland et al. 2001, ch. 7). This, however, would leave us with
two parameters, µ and λ, which cannot be calibrated in a single first-order condition
without further information.
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A.2 OECD data sources
The entries in Table 1 have been generated in the following way:
• “sL”: share of labour in value added. From OECD “Annual National Accounts
of OECD countries, Vol. 2”, Issue 2005, Table 2: Gross domestic product:
income approach. “1. Compensation of employees” / (“1. Compensation of em-
ployees” + “31. Gross operating surplus and gross mixed income”
• “tC”, “taL”, “tpi”: effective average tax rates on consumption, labour and capital
income. From OECD “Annual National Accounts of OECD countries, Vol. 2”,
Issue 2005, and OECD “Revenue Statistics”, Issue 2004. Calculated as proposed
in Mendoza et al. (1994) and further developed by Gurgel et al. (2007). In order
to better fit the tax bases identified in the model of this paper, I have used the
gross instead of the net capital income as basis for the capital (profit) tax. This
gives substantially lower capital tax rates than those reported in the papers
cited.
• “CRIP”: coefficient of residual income progression. Calculated as (1− tmL )/(1−
taL), where tmL and taL are taken from OECD “Taxing Wages”, Issue 2004, Single
no child earning 100% of average production worker (APW), entries “153” and
“144”, respectively.
• “u”: standardised unemployment rate. From OECD “Labour Force Statistics”,
Issue 2005, entry “(ALFS) Total labour force, All persons, Unemployment, %
total labor force”.
• “c”: replacement rate. From OECD “Benefits and Wages”, Issue 2004, Table
3.3a. (p. 102) “Average of Net Replacement Rates over 60 months of unem-
ployment 2001, for four family types and two earnings levels, in per cent”,
entry “without social assistance, no children, single person”.
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